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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0152  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC  
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA  
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0222  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0226  
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0222

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CIA FOR WINPAC  
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA  
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP  
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP  
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP  
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR  
NSC FOR LOOK  
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26  
TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#)  
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING,  
FEBRUARY 16, 2010

REF: 10 GENEVA 113 (SFO-GVA-VIII-039)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department  
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-054.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: February 16, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:20 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY  
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[1](#)3. (S) At the Definitions Working Group meeting chaired by Mr. Siemon and Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov, agreement was reached on the following four terms: "soft-site launcher;" "new type;" "variant;" and "warhead." The following definitions were discussed, but disagreement remained: "solid-fueled ICBM or solid-fueled SLBM" "solid rocket motor," "rocket motor case," and "non-deployed heavy bomber." The Russian side provided proposed definitions for "submarine base" and "launch." End summary.

14. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Terms and Definitions Discussed.

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TERMS AND DEFINITIONS DISCUSSED  
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15. (S) Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov stated the Russian side had reviewed the U.S.-proposed definitions for "soft-site launcher" and "new type," had no objections and recommended sending the two terms to the Conforming Group. The agreed terms were as follows.

Begin text:

The term "soft-site launcher" means any land-based fixed launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs other than a silo launcher.

The term "new type" means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a type of ICBM or SLBM, the technical characteristics of which differ from those of an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of each type declared previously in at least one of the following respects:

- (a) number of stages;
- (b) type of propellant of any stage;
- (c) length of either the assembled missile without front section or length of the first stage, by more than three percent;
- (d) diameter of the first stage, by more than three percent.

End text.

16. (S) Siemon asked if this meant the Russian side also agreed to delete the term "variant." At the previous meeting the U.S. side had stated that with agreement on the new text for "new type," the term "variant" was no longer needed (Ref A). Kuznetsov responded that the Russian side could not agree to delete "variant" since Part Five of the Protocol on Inspection Activities included the term and it should be retained due to the unpredictable future of heavy bombers and missiles.

17. (S) Siemon believed that if the sides agreed to drop the U.S. bracketed text in subparagraph (b) the definition could be sent to conforming. Kuznetsov agreed since the proposed definition retained text in subparagraph (b) that contained the concept of an item that was distinguishable from other items of the same type. The sides agreed to the following.

Begin text:

The term "variant" means:

- (a) for heavy bombers, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, of airplanes of one type and one category that are distinguishable from other airplanes of the same type and the same category;
- (b) for ICBMs and SLBMs, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, of ICBMs or SLBMs for the same type that are

distinguishable from other ICBMs or SLBMs of the same type.

End text.

¶18. (S) Kuznetsov provided an unofficial translation for the term "warhead" and indicated there were only two differences between the two side's definitions. The first was the Russian text substituted the actual limit for the reference to Article II (b) and broadened the definition by including a reference to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers. Siemon agreed with the proposed definition after which the sides agreed to send the definition to the Conforming Group. The sides agreed to the following.

Begin Text:

The term "warhead" means a unit of account for counting toward the 1550 aggregate limit as applied to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers.

End Text.

¶19. (S) Kuznetsov provided the U.S. side with an unofficial translation of the term "submarine base."

Begin text:

The term "submarine base" means a facility at which ballistic missile submarines, as well as submarines that had been previously equipped with launchers of SLBMs but after conversion are no longer capable of launching an SLBM, are based and that provides shore-based support for such submarines, which may include the assembly, loading, maintenance, and storage of SLBMs.

End text.

¶10. (S) The Russian side believed the term, which had been previously agreed, required redefinition because of the content of the U.S.-proposed Agreed Statement on U.S. Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs) Converted from SSBNs, currently dated February 15, 2010 and would assist Russian inspectors during inspections at submarine bases.

¶11. (S) Kuznetsov noted that the U.S. based SSBNs together with those that had been converted to SSGNs. The converted SSBNs remained susceptible to inspection for the purpose of confirming reconversion had not taken place. Therefore, the converted SSBNs needed to be on the coastlines and waters diagram.

¶12. (S) Mrs. Zdravecky asked if the Russian concept captured both SSBNs and those converted to SSGNs during inspection activities at bases where both were located, in addition to those bases where only the converted SSBNs were based. Kuznetsov indicated this was correct.

¶13. (S) Kuznetsov provided the U.S. side with an unofficial translation of the term "launch."

Begin text:

The term "launch" means the start and subsequent flight of a ballistic missile.

End text.

¶14. (S) Kuznetsov explained that the proposed definition was consistent with text that was included in the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles, dated May 31, 1988. He believed "launch" should replace "flight test" throughout the Treaty, Protocol and Annexes.

¶15. (S) Siemon remarked that he had considered replacing "flight test" with "launch" in Part Seven of the Protocol on Telemetry but had not considered this in other places of the Treaty or in the Annexes. He remarked that in English the word "launch" accurately described the beginning or start of a missile's flight. Kuznetsov suggested that the group continue the discussion at the next meeting.

¶16. (S) In reference to the Russian-proposed definition of "solid-fuel missile," Siemon stated he had spoken to U.S. members of the Conversion or Elimination (Core) Working Group who did not object to the proposed text; however, the formulation needed to be refined by broadening the definition to include the language "solid-fueled ICBM or solid-fueled SLBM" instead of "solid-fueled missile." Col Kamenskiy asked if the change was related to elimination procedures for solid-fueled ICBMs and solid-fueled SLBMs. Siemon replied in the affirmative. Siemon stated the Core Working Group indicated the need for definitions for the terms "solid rocket motor" and "rocket motor case" which were also related to the elimination process for solid-fueled ICBMs and solid-fueled SLBMs. The sides agreed to continue this discussion at the next meeting.

¶17. (S) Kuznetsov asked if there was any further movement on the U.S. side on the term "non-deployed heavy bomber." Siemon stated that although the U.S. side did not have a formal proposal, he believed the proposed definition could be similar to the following: "The term non-deployed heavy bomber means a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments that is a test heavy bomber or a heavy bomber at a repair facility."

¶18. (S) Kuznetsov noted that the sides had agreed that a deployed

heavy bomber was a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments. The sides had a common understanding of a "type" of heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments and of the conversion of a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments into a heavy bomber not equipped for nuclear armaments. He believed that until the moment when the last heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments of a type had been converted to a heavy bomber not equipped for nuclear armaments, that type was considered a deployed heavy bomber. His concept was based on the entire type and not the individual airplane.

¶19. Mr. Dean clarified that in the U.S. concept a deployed heavy bomber was a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments that was not a test heavy bomber or at a repair facility. A non-deployed heavy bomber was the opposite; a heavy bomber that was a test heavy bomber or at a repair facility. The U.S. concept was to be applied on an airplane by airplane basis. It focused on the individual airplane and not the entire type. Kuznetsov could not accept this definition. The entire type was deployed until the last one of the type had been converted. The definition could not be based on an airplane by airplane basis. He used the conversion of the B-1B and possible conversion of the B-52H as examples. All airplanes of the type were considered deployed no matter where they were located and would be considered deployed until all of the type had been converted.

¶20. (S) Siemon explained the U.S. concept of a deployed or non-deployed heavy bomber only applied to those bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. In the U.S. view strategic offensive arms were considered to be nuclear equipped. Once a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments was converted so that it was no longer equipped for nuclear armaments it was no longer subject to the limit of the Treaty. It was no longer deployed. Siemon believed there would only be a small number of non-deployed heavy bombers in the new treaty and that small number would be equipped for nuclear armaments but were either test heavy bombers or those at a repair facility to receive maintenance. B-1Bs equipped for nuclear armaments counted against the treaty aggregate limit for deployed and non-deployed strategic vehicles. Once a B-1B was converted it no longer counted against this limit. The U.S. planned to convert all B-1Bs and Siemon indicated that the conversion was scheduled to be completed during this calendar year. Once the conversions were completed all B-1Bs, the entire type, would no longer be subject to the Treaty.

¶21. (S) Kuznetsov did not understand how the U.S. concept conformed to Paragraph 6 and 7 of Article III. He believed that both converted and non-converted B-1Bs were of the same type, so both should be subject to the limit of the Treaty until the last one was converted. Dean clarified that Paragraph 6 referred to the entire class of heavy bombers that the Treaty called a type. The Treaty did not say that if one heavy bomber of a type was equipped for nuclear armaments the entire type was equipped for nuclear armaments. Lt Col Comeau explained how the U.S.-proposed Agreed Statement on B-1B heavy bombers supported this concept. When Kuznetsov questioned the heavy bombers at the Davis-Monthan CorE Facility, Dean stated the Agreed Statement on the basing of deployed heavy bombers at the CorE facility located at

Davis-Monthan AFB would justify this situation. Siemon emphasized that the only way to remove a deployed heavy bomber from the accountability of the Treaty was to eliminate or convert it. As long as a heavy bomber was equipped for nuclear armaments it was subject to the Treaty. The sides agreed to continue the discussion at the next meeting.

¶22. (U) Documents provided:

- Russia:

-- Unofficial translation Proposal of the Russian Federation on the term "warhead," dated February 16, 2010;

-- Unofficial translation Proposal of the Russian Federation on changing the term "submarine base," dated February 16, 2010; and

-- Unofficial translation Proposal of the Russian Federation on replacing the term "flight test" with a term "launch," dated February 16, 2010.

¶23. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Siemon

Mr. Connell

Lt Col Comeau

Mr. Dean

Mr. Hanchett (RO)

Mr. Stickney

Mr. Taylor

Mrs. Zdravecky

Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov

Ms. Fuzhenkova

Mr. Kamenskiy

Mr. Trifonov

Ms. Komshilova (Int)

¶24. (U) Gottemoeller sends.  
KING